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1 Anti-privatisation debates 
The Indonesian Water Law was controversial
even before enactment in 2004. During
parliamentary debate, members of the House of
Representatives from various political affiliations
expressed their concern through minderheidsnota,1
although the Law was eventually unanimously
passed by the parliament. 
A total of 19 articles on the Water Law were
submitted for Judicial Review. Of all the 
articles, only four of them (Articles 9, 40, 45 and
46) are in fact directly related to ‘privatisation’ –
both in terms of water resources and services.
The remainder deal with the application of
economic principles in water resources
management. During this process, United
Nations documents such as the Resolution for
the International Drinking Water Supply and
Sanitation Decade (United Nations 1980),
Agenda 21 (United Nations 1993) and the
General Comment 15 (United Nations CESCR
2003) were referred to, as well as the Dublin
Principles, which emphasised water as ‘an
economic good’. Agenda 212 – rather than New
Delhi – was perceived as the antithesis to Dublin
and emerged as one of the instruments cited
during the Review process. 
Expert testimony outlined that the principal
differences between Dublin and Agenda 21 was
that the former emphasis was on water as an
economic good while the latter described water
both as an economic and social good. With two
dissenting opinions, the petitions to revoke the
Law were eventually rejected by the Court,
declaring the Law to be ‘Conditionally
Constitutional’.3
However, the anti-privatisation debate has not
subsided. Activists have sought the possibility of
a further Judicial Review and are collecting
evidence to reinforce their arguments. Some
have requested that the implementing
regulation of the Water Law on water services –
the Government Regulation 16 Year 2005 – on
Drinking Water Provision System be nullified.4 In
this polarised atmosphere there have been
complaints within the Ministry of Public Works
that opposition has impeded the enactment of a
Draft Government Regulation on Water Use
Rights, which – if issued – would be the most
Anti-Privatisation Debates, Opaque
Rules and ‘Privatised’ Water Services
Provision: Some Lessons from
Indonesia
Mohamad Mova Al 'Afghani
Abstract Anti-privatisation debates dominate Indonesia’s contemporary water discourse. This has culminated
in attempts at invalidating the Water Law through a Judicial Review. Finally rejected by the Constitutional
Court, the law remains in place, although polarised debate remains and prevents greater regulation across
the sector. The polarised debate leads to hesitations in regulating private sector participation (PSP). As a
result, there is a major lack of regulation of PSP in the water sector. This article examines two contexts –
Jakarta, where a concession takes place and Bogor, where the service is run entirely by a publicly owned
company. Customer rights, such as the right to be connected, to enjoy certain service levels, to
compensation, to financial aid, to redress mechanisms, including the right to participation and transparency,
barely exist in Jakarta but are adequately guaranteed in Bogor.
IDS Bulletin Volume 43  Number 2  March 2012   © 2012 The Author. IDS Bulletin © 2012 Institute of Development Studies
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
21
important implementing regulation of the Water
Law.5 As one author puts it: 
… a small handful of non-state actors and
activist organizations are not pluralistic by
definition… Discussions have not helped
expand discourses toward a reconciliatory
realm of promoting a plural public policy
debate (Regmi 2010).
We examine further these polarised debates
through an assessment of the experience of two
cities – Jakarta and Bogor.
2 Opaque rules on Private Sector Participation
Indonesian water services are regulated
primarily by two rules: the Water Law 7/20046
and the Government Regulation 16 Year 2005
(GR-16).7 Out of 100 articles in Law 7/2004, only
one paragraph specifically regulates Private
Sector Participation (PSP): paragraph 4 of
Article 40. Central government has also issued
numerous guidelines in the form of ‘Ministerial
Regulations’, but they are not binding on
regional governments. Water services are the
responsibility of local government. 
The single paragraph in the Water Law that is
supposed to regulate PSP does not provide clarity
as to the extent and format of PSP allowed by the
Water Law. Paragraph 4 states ‘Cooperatives,
privately-owned business enterprises and [members of
the] society may participate in the undertaking of
the development of [the] drinking water
provision system’ (author’s italics). In order to
obtain coherent interpretation, one needs to pay
attention to the preceding paragraph (paragraph
3) which states: ‘State Owned Enterprises and
Regionally Owned Enterprises are the undertakers8
of [the] drinking water provision system’
(author’s italics). The phrase ‘merupakan
penyelenggara’ in paragraph 4 of Article 40 has
often been translated as ‘… will be the organizers
of … and ‘… shall carry out the development of
…’. However, since ‘penyelenggara’ is a noun,
whereas ‘merupakan’ is a statement of being, the
author regards that ‘… are the undertakers of …’
is the most appropriate English translation. 
The rationale in separating the provision
regulating the private sector in paragraph 4 with
provision on State Owned Enterprises in
paragraph 3 must be that the drafters of the law
intended their roles to be differentiated. The
author concludes that the drafters must have
intended for State Owned Enterprises to be the
main actor in the provision of drinking water
while not entirely forbidding PSP. If PSP is to be
regulated in great detail, there is a higher risk of
invalidation by the Constitutional Court, as
shown on the Judicial Review of the Electricity
Law. Hence, the drafters left the clause on PSP
vague and subsumed it in the same clause
regulating cooperatives and ‘other’ members of
the community. 
Paragraph 4 of Article 64 of GR-16 stipulates that
any involvement of the cooperatives or privately
owned business enterprise should be done
through a proper procurement procedure, as
stipulated under prevailing laws and regulations
while the fifth paragraph stipulates that following
such procurement, the cooperatives or privately
owned business enterprise shall ‘enter into
agreement’ with the government. 
3 ‘Neglected’ PSPs 
3.1 A brief history of Jakarta’s ‘concession’
There is a vast literature addressing the problems
of the Jakarta water concession (see Kooy 2008;
Iwanami and Nickson 2008; Bakker 2006, 2007).
In late 1991, a combination of the World Bank and
Japanese aid provided a loan to PAM Jaya
(Jakarta’s Regional Waterworks Company) in
order to repair and expand its infrastructure
(Harsono 2005). Soon after the loan was provided,
the World Bank approached the Indonesian
government to allow private sector participation
in Jakarta’s water system. In 1995, the coverage of
PAM Jaya was only 45 per cent, 30 per cent of
which received intermittent supply (Jensen 2005).
In 1996, unaccounted for water was more than 55
per cent. Due to these problems, more investment
was needed in order to expand coverage (Lanti
2006). The government thought that inviting
private sector input would lower tariffs and bring
investment to the city’s ailing water infrastructure
(Braadbaart 2007). RWE Thames Water acted
first (Harsono 2005) by forming an alliance with
Sigit Harjojudanto, the son of the ruling President
Soeharto (ibid.) in exchange for a 20 per cent
ownership of the project company. This move was
later followed by Suez Lyonnaise by forming an
alliance with the Salim Group, who were also close
to former President Soeharto.9
Without any public tender and to the
disappointment of the World Bank (Braadbaart
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2007), Soeharto finally agreed to privatise
Jakarta’s water supply in 1995 and subsequently
ordered the Ministry of Public Works at that
time to divide Jakarta into two service regions
bordering the Ciliwung River. One part was to be
given to his son Harjojudanto and Thames and
the other half was to be provided to the Salim
group and Suez. The negotiation process would
take two years. 
According to Braadbaart, the contract was signed
with the most important contractual risks borne
by PAM Jaya: (1) currency risk; (2) gradual tariff
increase and projected sales; and (3) bulk water
supplies. One of the most fatal blows to the
contractual design was linking the security of
these risks to private sector performance. In the
event that PAM Jaya failed to secure the risks,
the private sector would not be obligated to
materialise its commitments.10
Agreement on the original Jakarta ‘concession’
bypassed any official procurement rules (Harsono
2003). Many have discussed that the contract
contained flaws with unbalanced distribution of
risks and built-in disincentives for both the
private sectors and the PAM Jaya to extend the
network to the poor (Bakker 2006, 2007). What is
rarely discussed is the legal framework
surrounding the ‘concession’ contract. 
As discussed in the previous section, both Water
Law 7/2004 and the GR-16, although vague in
terms of ownership and regulatory model, to a
limited extent regulate service levels,11 customer
service, and good governance issues.12 Both the
regulator and the private sector denied, however,
that Water Law and GR-16 were applicable to
the Jakarta Cooperation Contract.13 Indeed, the
Water Law does not contain any provision
obligating that licences issued prior to its
enactment be adjusted accordingly. This has
been criticised at the Water Law’s Judicial
Review. Without the new rules applicable to the
concession contract, the Jakarta PSP is left with
two regional by-laws regulating water services. 
However, water service in Jakarta is regulated by
an 18-year-old rule, Regional By-Law 11/1993
(‘By-Law 11’). Enacted in 1993, four years before
the ‘concession’ contract was entered in 1997, this
has never been reformed or amended since and is
still in force today. Most rules in water services
would contain the rights and obligation of
customers. Some of the rights guaranteed are the
right to be connected, the right to enjoy a certain
level of service (see Hendry 2008), the right to
customer service, the right to be compensated,
the right to financial aid, the right to redress,
including the right to ‘good governance’ processes
such as the right to participation and
transparency (Al ’Afghani 2009) of the regulatory
process. None of these rights are guaranteed by
By-Law 11 and some are even denied.  
The only ‘rights’ provided by By-Law 11 are the
‘right’ to ask for examination of a water meter,14
to complain against inaccurate water metering
(although it will not suspend their obligation to
pay their monthly water tariffs)15 and the right to
make an ‘objection’ to the governor over
penalties for water theft levied by PAM Jaya’s
director. Even this right to object is ‘binding’16
and no other recourse is provided by By-Law 11
although access to Court is in theory available.
The absence of customer rights, participation,
transparency mechanisms and the power vested
on PAM Jaya to arbitrarily disconnect customers
for non-payment appears to challenge the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to which Indonesia is
a party.17
3.2 Comparing Jakarta’s regional by-laws (concession)
with Bogor’s regional by-law (publicly owned)
In order to obtain a clearer picture of the
‘neglect’ of PSP in the water sector, this section
contrasts the regulatory framework in water
services between Jakarta and Bogor. Bogor is a
municipality 60km south of Jakarta with a
population of 750,000 (compared to Jakarta’s
10 million) and its water services are run by a
publicly owned company. 
Bogor’s water services by-law was modified in
1996 and 2006. The 2006 amendment is
particularly distinctive as it contains many
guarantees on service levels and customer rights.
The regional autonomy, which delegates the
management of drinking water services to local
government, might have been the driver for these
reforms. This can be seen from a tendency in
several other regions to conduct utilities reform
after the autonomy was introduced in 2001.18
The comparison between Jakarta’s 1992/3 by-laws
with Bogor’s by-law, comes under five categories:
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duty to connect, service level/customer service,
customer rights, redress mechanisms and
tariff/bill components. These are discussed below.19
In Jakarta’s by-laws, there is a duty to serve a
connection request from the industrial, residential
or tourist sectors20 imposed on the regional-owned
waterworks company. However, there is no duty
directly imposed on the private sector to connect
customers. In Bogor, there is a general duty ‘to
serve’ water services for its residents and a
specific duty to extend the network to regions
with groundwater of inadequate quality.21
In terms of service levels, the Jakarta by-laws refer
to the Ministerial Decree on drinking water
quality;22 but in practice, changes to the Decree are
not automatically applicable. Due to the
concession, changes to water quality regulation
must be negotiated with the private sector. On the
other hand, any changes to water quality
regulation are directly applicable in Bogor. The
Bogor regional by-law also contains provisions
regulating service disruptions, the general
obligation for the regional waterworks company to
supply water of a certain quality, continuity and
quantity (except in the event of force majeure) and a
24-hour customer service call centre and mailbox.23
In terms of customer rights, the only ‘right’
available in the Jakarta regional by-law is the
‘right’ to object to PAM Jaya about an incorrect
water meter,24 the ‘right’ to object against
imposition of penalties by the Governor and the
‘right’ to request an examination of the water
meter. Even these are not directly formulated as
rights. The word used is ‘may’, i.e. ‘dapat
mengajukan keberatan’(‘may’ propose objection). On
the other hand, the Bogor regional by-law
contains provisions guaranteeing several rights,
including to: (i) obtain results on the examination
of water quality, accuracy of metering device,
calculation of water bill; (ii) obtain an explanation
on the agreed terms when submitting new
connection requests; (iii) obtain information on
the structure and amount of tariff; and
(iv) receive a 50 per cent discount of the monthly
fee if the water supply is disconnected on three
consecutive days without prior notice.25
4 Conclusion
Drafters of the Water Law refrained from
creating detailed provisions and chose to
regulate PSP only vaguely. Out of 100 articles in
the Water Law, only one paragraph is dedicated
specifically to regulating PSP in water services.
This move was criticised by one of the Judges’
Dissenting Opinion as a ‘disguised privatisation’. 
At the local level where PSP occurs, such as in
Jakarta, regulatory reforms have stopped at two
18-year-old regional by-laws, which have never
been amended since enactment. Hence, the
Jakarta ‘concession’ took place without sufficient
back-up from a wider regulatory framework. In
the present by-laws, there are no adequate
guarantees on the utilities’ duty to provide
connections, service level/customer service,
customer rights, redress mechanism or
tariff/bills. In Bogor, by contrast, where water is
publicly owned, these are effectively regulated.
The anti-privatisation debate has not been
successful in democratising water services;
instead, because of the government’s reluctance
to regulate PSP, this has resulted in water
services being negotiated bilaterally through
contractual means between government and the
private sector, and away from public scrutiny. 
For PSP to be better regulated in the future,
Indonesia needs to move to a consensus at a
national level. As a starting point, this requires
anti-privatisation debates to become
progressively depolarised. 
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Notes
1 Minderheidsnota is a minor note from the
legislator. The content of the minderheidsnota is
not binding as law but could be used to
supplement interpretation and to provide
insight into the history of the formation of a law. 
2 United Nations (1993). See para 18.8:
‘Integrated water resources management is
based on the perception of water as an
integral part of the ecosystem, a natural
resource and a social and economic good,
whose quantity and quality determine the
nature of its utilization’.
3 Judicial Review of the Law No 7 Year 2004
regarding Water Resources, Judgment of
13 July 2005, No 058-059-060-063/PUUII/2004,
Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Indonesia, 2005.
4 Pemerintah Harus Koreksi Privatisasi Sumber
Daya Air [The Government Must Correct
Water Resources Privatisation], Suara
Pembaruan, Jakarta, 2005.
5 Personal communications with a consultant
from the Ministry of Public Works, April 2009.
6 Undang Undang No 7 Tahun 2004 Tentang
Sumber Daya Air [Law No 7 Year 2004 on
Water Resources], Indonesia.
7 Peraturan Pemerintah No 16 Tahun 2005
Tentang Pengembangan Sistem Penyediaan
Air Minum [Government Regulation 16 Year
2005 on Drinking Water Provision System],
Indonesia.
8 Undang Undang No 7 Tahun 2004 Tentang
Sumber Daya Air [Fn 8: Law No 7 Year 2004
on Water Resources], Indonesia.
9 ‘Access to politics is essential. The water
business is always political, Bernard Lafrogne,
a Suez representative in Jakarta, told me’
(Harsono 2005).
10 In one interview, a member of the Jakarta
Water Sector Regulatory Body (JWSRB)
demonstrated the stance of the private sector
and its lawyers that the contract is not
measured by performance. Hence, there is an
inherent lack of incentive for the private
sector to achieve service level targets in the
contractual design (Jakarta, December 2009).
11 Article 68, GR-16.
12 Article 68, GR-16.
13 Various field interviews with the regulatory
body, the private sector and NGOs in Jakarta,
January–February 2011.
14 Article 20.1, By-Law 11 (Jakarta).
15 Article 19.1 and 2, By-Law 11 (Jakarta).
16 Article 28.3, By-Law 11 (Jakarta).
17 International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights New York, 16 December
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 993,
p. 3; depositary notification C.N.781.2001. See
also United Nations CESCR (2003) and de
Albuquerque (2010). 
18 See regional by-laws enacted in various
regions, for example (2003) Peraturan Daerah
Kabupaten Takalar No 15 Tahun 2003
Tentang Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum,
(2004) Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Sragen
No 8 Tahun 2004 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah
Air Minum Kabupaten Sragen, (2006)
Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Kalimantan Barat
No 2 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pendirian
Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Provinsi
Kalimantan Barat, (2011) Peraturan Daerah
Kendal No 13 Tahun 2011, (2011) Peraturan
Daerah Kabupaten Maros No 4 Tahun 2011
Tentang Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum
[(2003) Regional By-Law of Takalar Regency
No 15 Year 2003 on Regional Drinking Water
Company; (2004) Regional By-Law of Sragen
Regency No 8 Year 2004 on Sragen Regional
Drinking Water Company; (2006) Regional
By-Law of West Kalimantan Province No 2
Year 2006 on the Establishment of West
Kalimantan Drinking Water Company; (2011)
Regional By-Law of Kendal Regency No 13
Year 2011; (2011) Regional By-Law of Maros
Regency No 4 Year 2011 on Regional Drinking
Water Company].
19 Service standards including drinking water
quality standard, duties to extend network
and customer service standard are among the
common features of a water services law. See
Hendry (2008).
20 By-Law 13 (Jakarta). 
21 Indonesia Peraturan Daerah Kota Bogor
Nomor 5 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pelayanan Air
Minum Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Tirta
Pakuan Kota Bogor. Article 3 hereinafter
‘By-Law 5 (Bogor)’. 
22 Article 19.1, By-Law 13 (Jakarta).
23 Article 20, By-Law 5 (Bogor).
24 Article 15, By-Law 11 (Jakarta).
25 Article 20, By-Law 5 (Bogor).
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